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We study the interaction between private and public funding of innovative 
projects in the presence of adverse-selection based financing constraints. 
Government programmes allocating direct subsidies are based on ex-ante 
screening of the subsidy applications. This selection scheme may yield valuable 
information to market-based financiers. We find that under certain conditions, 
public R&D subsidies can reduce the financing constraints of technology-based 
entrepreneurial firms. Firstly, the subsidy itself reduces the capital costs related to 
innovation projects by reducing the amount of market-based capital required. 
Secondly, the observation that an entrepreneur has received a subsidy for an 
innovation project provides an informative signal to market-based financiers. We 
also find that public screening works more efficiently if it is accompanied by 
subsidy allocation. 
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Previous research suggests asymmetric information about the quality of an
innovation project between the entrepreneur and the ﬁnancier leads to a higher
cost of external than internal capital, creating a funding gap. This funding gap
may prevent especially small and new technology-based entrepreneurial ﬁrms
from undertaking economically viable innovation projects. This observation
has provided grounds for government intervention aimed at reducing ﬁnancing
constraints of technology-based start-ups. One of such policy tools is
direct subsidies to corporate R&D. However, the theoretical literature linking
ﬁnancing constraints and R&D subsidies is sparse. Our goal is to analyze
how a governmental R&D subsidy program works in the presence of ﬁnancial
constraints created by asymmetric information.
Based on the famous lemons problem identiﬁed by Akerlof (1970), there
is a huge literature that singles out adverse selection as a major source of
ﬁnancing constraints. Entrepreneurs have better information about the quality
of their own projects than lenders, whose valuation of the projects reﬂect
average project quality. This may raise the rate of return required by lenders
so high that it becomes unproﬁtable for an entrepreneur without suﬃcient
internal funding to undertake an economically viable project.
Two interrelated solutions to the adverse-selection problem have been
proposed: signaling and ﬁnancial intermediation. An entrepreneur’s
willingness to invest in the project or to oﬀer collateral could serve as a credible
signal of the quality of her project (Leland and Pyle, 1977, and Bester, 1985).
Reputation may also reduce ﬁnancing constraints, because over time borrowers
who manage to acquire good reputation encounter less severe informational
problems (Diamond, 1989). Financial intermediaries such as banks in turn
could alleviate ﬁnancing constraints through information gathering, because
they might be able to screen and monitor loan applicants at a cost advantage
relative to individual lenders (see, eg Diamond, 1984, and Chan, Greenbaum
and Thakor, 1986). In particular, it has been argued that venture capital
and related organizations can, through intensive screening and monitoring,
overcome informational problems and mitigate capital constraints (eg Lerner,
1998).
There are, however, several arguments why the proposed solutions may
fail to eliminate ﬁnancing constraints, especially in the case of science and
technology-based start-ups. First, such entrepreneurs may lack the means to
signal project quality. Human-capital intensive projects do not often involve
collateralizable assets. Own wealth is insuﬃcient or liquid, and is generally
needed to invest in the project. Second, reputation building takes time and
start-ups, almost by deﬁnition, cannot have established reputation. Third, the
screening activities of ﬁnancial intermediaries may be ineﬃcient. According
to the so called competition-stability tradeoﬀ, competition in banking sector
can reduce banks’ information surplus and thereby their incentives to gather
information (eg Keeley, 1990).1 Information reusability can also be hampered
1The existence of competition-stability tradeoﬀ is of course debatable but it may
especially apply for project-level ﬁnancing (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006).
7by intemporal volatility of borrower credit risks (Chan et al, 1986). Moreover,
ﬁnancial innovation has enabled the intermediaries to transfer credit risk oﬀ
their balance sheets, which may have undermined their incentives to screen
new borrowers.
Even venture capital organizations may fail to provide an adequate solution
to ﬁnancing constraints (see, eg Hall, 2002, and Lerner, 1998, 2002). Only a
modest number of ﬁrms in speciﬁc sectors receive venture capital funding each
year. Venture capital investments also tend to be too large for the smallest
ﬁrms. A well-functioning venture capital market requires a well-functioning
small and new ﬁrm stock market enabling viable exits from venture capital
investments. Such exit opportunities for venture capital investors are limited
in most countries. In addition, the threat of expropriation may undermine
screening activities (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983, and Ueda, 2004). To
obtain external funding, an entrepreneur needs to reveal valuable private
information about her project to a ﬁnancier, which creates a risk that the
ﬁnancier steals the information.
Informational problems are acknowledged to be particularly severe in
ﬁnancing of R&D projects (Hubbard, 1998, and Alam and Walton, 1995).
R&D activities typically involve soft information that is hard to verify. Hence,
if adverse selection related ﬁnancing constraints exist, they should be especially
relevant to science and technology-based start-ups whose main assets are
founders’ human capital and intellectual property. Such ﬁrms cannot have
acquired reputation nor assets that can be oﬀered as collateral. Moreover,
credit worthiness of these ﬁrm is diﬃcult to assess, and even venture capital
organizations are likely to favor ﬁrms with some track records over pure
start-ups (Amit, Brander and Zott, 1998).
In line with the funding gap hypothesis caused by adverse selection, there is
indeed abundant evidence that R&D investment are sensitive to cash ﬂow, at
least in the case of newly established, small, technology-based ﬁrms (eg Hall,
1992, Hao and Jaﬀe, 1993, Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994, Bond, Harhoﬀ and
Van Reenen, 2003, and Bougheas, Görg and Strobl, 2001). Similarly, Finnish
evidence points that newly established technology-based small and medium
size ﬁrms may suﬀer from ﬁnancial constraints (Hyytinen and Pajarinen,
2002).2
Given the problems in ﬁnancing of R&D by small ﬁrms, Governments
in several countries have intervened to reduce ﬁnancing constraints. One
widely-used policy tool is direct subsidies to corporate R&D. In contrast to
some other innovation policy tools such as R&D tax credits, Government
programs allocating direct subsidies are based on a speciﬁc selection scheme.
This selection is done by ex-ante screening of the applications.
We develop a model of innovation ﬁnance where capital constrained
entrepreneurs can try to tap a public agency for funding in addition to
private funding sources. We analyze whether R&D subsidy policies can reduce
2As usually, there is also some contradictory evidence. For example, Blass and Yosha
(2003) do not ﬁnd indication of ﬁnancing constraints when studying publicly traded
R&D-intensive manufacturing ﬁrms in Israel. However, publicly traded ﬁrms can be
considered as relatively large and well-established, which are less likely to suﬀer from
ﬁnancing constraints.
8adverse-selection based ﬁnancing constraints. It turns out that under certain
circumstances, they can. The eﬀect comes through two channels. First, the
subsidy itself reduces the capital costs related to the innovation projects by
reducing the amount of market-based funding needed. Second, the observation
that an entrepreneur has received a subsidy for an innovation project provides
an informative signal to the market-based ﬁnancier.
Our modeling framework builds on Holmström and Tirole (1997), which
has subsequently been used to study entrepreneurial ﬁnance, eg by Repullo
and Suarez (2000) and Da Rin, Nicodano and Sembanelli (2005). These
papers highlight the role of interim monitoring by informed ﬁnanciers (banks
or venture capital organizations) in mitigating moral hazard problem and in
bringing along less well-informed investors. Instead of moral hazard, we focus
on adverse selection created by ex-ante informational asymmetries, and the role
of screening and signaling by a public funding agency in reducing ﬁnancing
constraints. Our starting point is that banks are not informed enough and
venture capital markets do not function well enough to eliminate ﬁnancing
constraints of small, innovative ﬁrms. We analyze under which circumstances
R&D subsidies allocated by a public agency could improve the situation. In
particular, we study whether a subsidy by a public agency could act as a
certiﬁcation for an unknown entrepreneur and ease her possibilities to secure
funding from market-based ﬁnanciers. While the idea of certiﬁcation by a
trusted ﬁnancial intermediary is pervasive in the corporate ﬁnance literature,
to the best of our knowledge, it has not been previously applied to the public
funding of corporate R&D (but see Lerner, 2002, for an informal discussion).
Despite that R&D subsidies are ubiquitous in developed countries, the
theoretical literature examining R&D subsidies is rather limited. The majority
o fe a r l i e rs t u d i e sa r eb a s e do nt h ev i e wt h a tg o v e r n m e n ti n t e r v e n t i o ni nR & D
is needed because social beneﬁts of R&D are higher than their private returns.
Subsidies and their allocation are taken as given and the focus is on analyzing
how R&D subsidies aﬀect ﬁrm behavior (eg Stenbacka and Tombak, 1998, and
Maurer and Scotchmer, 2004).
There is, however, a large related literature on the need to subsidize
entrepreneurs or their ﬁnance in the presence of asymmetric information arising
from the inﬂuential contributions by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and de Meza and
Webb (1987). As summarized by Boadway and Keen (2005), the results depend
on what are assumed about the project return distributions. In particular,
adverse selection may generate too much lending to entrepreneurs rather than
ﬁnancing constraints. In our model, too, the beneﬁcial eﬀects of subsidies
are more limited if the problem caused by adverse selection is overinvestment
rather than ﬁnancing constraints. This literature, however, abstracts from
s i g n a l i n gr o l eo fs u b s i d i e sa sw e l la sf r o ms o c i a lb e n e ﬁts of R&D.
The design and the institutional setting of the R&D subsidy program
modeled in this paper are inspired by the Finnish institutional environment,
b u tt h es i t u a t i o nw ed e s c r i b ei sc o m m o ni nm a n yc o u n t r i e sw h e r ep u b l i cR & D
9subsidy programs are in place and the markets for private start-up ﬁnance are
imperfect.3
Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 identiﬁes the funding gap by
analyzing entrepreneurs’ possibilities to fund their innovation projects in the
absence of subsidies. Section 4 presents a dynamic game of incomplete
information describing the subsidy application and allocation process. The
section concludes with the equilibrium strategies of both the public agency
and the entrepreneurs. Section 5, links public and market-based ﬁnanciers to
analyze the eﬀects of subsidies on the funding gap. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2T h e m o d e l
The model has three types of risk-neutral agents: (potential) entrepreneurs,
market-based ﬁnanciers, and a public ﬁnancier. As will be speciﬁed below,
entrepreneurs have some initial wealth but are nonetheless capital constrained
a n dn e e dt os e e kf u n d i n gf r o me x t e r n a lﬁnanciers to be able to launch their
projects. The entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in terms of their type (‘talent’),
which determines the productivity of their projects. Following the convention
in the literature (see, eg de Meza and Webb, 1987, and Boadway and Keen,
2005), we assume that the entrepreneur’s type is her private information but
the level of her initial wealth is common knowledge (or at least veriﬁable). We
proceed as if entrepreneurs ﬁrst tried to seek public funding before turning
to private sources but we could equally well assume that entrepreneurs ﬁrst
contacted market-based ﬁnanciers who would make their funding decisions
contingent on the public funding decision. We will look for Perfect Bayesian
equilibria (PBE), which require that at each stage of the game, the agents’
strategies are optimal given their beliefs, and the beliefs are obtained from
equilibrium strategies and observed actions using Bayes’ rule.
2.1 Entrepreneurs
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs who have access to an innovation
project requiring an investment of size I. The projects have a two-point return
distribution: A fraction of p of the entrepreneurs are high (H) types having
access to a positive net-present value (NPV) project, the rest (1−p) are low (L)
types with a negative NPV project. Let λi and Ri denote the project success
probability and the project return conditional on success of an entrepreneur of
3In particular, the R&D subsidy program we have in mind is the one operated by the
National Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation in Finland (Tekes). For more
details on Tekes and on the Finnish innovation policy environment, see, eg Georghiu et
al (2003). Some other examples of related R&D subsidy programs include the Advanced
Technology Program (ATP) and the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program7
in US, R&D subsidy programs in Israel, R&D grants allocated by the Federal Ministry of
Research and Education in Germany, and R&D subsidy program of the Institute for the
Promotion of Innovation by Science and Technology in Flanders (IWT) in Belgium.
10type i,i∈ {H,L}. A failed project yields zero irrespective of the entrepreneur’s
type. Following Holmström and Tirole (1997), we assume that λH >λ L,
RL >R H, λHRH >I>λ LRL.4
Entrepreneurs diﬀer in the amount of their initial capital (cash) A,w h i c h
is distributed across entrepreneurs according to a cumulative distribution
function G(A), and it is independent of the entrepreneur’s type. No
entrepreneur has more than I of initial wealth, so G(A) is deﬁn e do ni n t e r v a l
[0,I]. A project is initiated only when an entrepreneur invests all her initial
capital in her own project and manages to raise the rest of the required funds
I − A from other sources.5
2.2 Public ﬁnancier
One source of ﬁnance is public funding provided by a public agency which
is called Government in the following. This public funding is a pure subsidy
that needs not to be paid back but it needs to be applied for. To apply
for the public funding, an entrepreneur needs to incur a ﬁxed cost of c.I n
practice, application process involves both monetary and non-monetary costs,
such as the costs of ﬁlling and ﬁling the application form and providing the
necessary supplementary data, the opportunity costs of time and eﬀort that
the application process consumes. Since allowing for both monetary and
non-monetary costs would be unnecessarily complicate the analysis, we assume
that c is a monetary cost.6 This means that if the entrepreneur applies for a
subsidy, the total size of the project will be I + c instead of I.
For simplicity, we assume that Government can give a ﬁxed subsidy (S)
to any project to which public funding is applied for. Government’s budget
constraint does not bind, but the use of public funds involves an opportunity
cost of 1+g (0 < g < 1).7 A successful project may generate social beneﬁt
to Government beyond the private return Ri.S u c h s o c i a l b e n e ﬁtc o v e r st h e
4In words, project return distributions are characterized by second-order stochastic
dominance (but not mean preserving spread). The same assumption is also used e.g. in
de Meza and Webb (2000). The practical interpretation of project return distributions is
that low-type entrepreneurs are overly optimistic or have unrealistic projects.
5In accordance with the pecking-order hypothesis (Myers and Majluf, 1984), in
equilibrium, it is cheaper for H-type entrepreneurs to use their own funds than raise funds
from outside. As a result, L-type entrepreneurs have no other option but to follow and
invest all their initial capital in their own projects. Since there is no outside collateral in
the model, collateral requirements cannot be used as a screening device. As well-known,
if potential entrepreneurs had non-liquid (outside) wealth, collateral requirements would
facilitate emergence of a separating equilibrium (see, eg Bester, 1985).
6This is without loss of generality. Note, however, that opportunity costs, too, show up
in a balance sheet to the extent the application process requires hiring of speciﬁc personnel
or outsourcing.
7While the assumptions of a ﬁxed subsidy and the absence of Government’s budget
constraint are used elsewhere in the literature (see, eg Maurer and Scotchmer, 2004), they
should clearly be relaxed in future research. However, the assumptions are perhaps not so
strong as they may sound from the outset. For example, in practice subsidy per entrepreneur
is often capped to a certain limit and such capping can be optimal in the presence of adverse
selection (Fuest and Tillessen, 2005).
11externalities generated by the project including, eg, spillovers and consumer
surplus. More speciﬁcally, we assume that private and social beneﬁts are
positively correlated: a successful project of a high-type entrepreneur generates
as o c i a lb e n e ﬁt W to Government whereas a low-type entrepreneur’s project
generates no social beneﬁt irrespective of its success.
As will be clear later, assuming that only successful high-type projects
generate social beneﬁts is not crucial for any of the main qualitative results of
the paper. For example, by letting W =0our results immediately generalize
to the usual case analyzed in the literature of entrepreneurial ﬁnance where no
project yields social beneﬁts beyond private returns. We could also equally well
assume that a low-type entrepreneur’s project generates social beneﬁts in so far
the net welfare of the low-type’s project remains negative. Similarly, we could
assume that failed projects generate societal beneﬁts in so far such beneﬁts
are small enough. While we think that positive correlation between private
and social returns is both realistic and theoretically sound, this assumption
could also be relaxed. Such a change or assuming a positive net welfare of the
low-type entrepreneur’s project would modify the welfare implications of the
model but not its basic structure.
Government does not observe the types of entrepreneurs but have an access
to a screening technology. If Government receives an application for a subsidy
from an entrepreneur, Government can learn the type of the entrepreneur
by screening the application. For simplicity, we assume that screening is
costly but perfect: by incurring a screening cost σ,G o v e r n m e n tc a nv e r i f y
the entrepreneur’s true type. A major task of the personnel in the public
funding agencies is to evaluate project proposals and they are classiﬁed in many
dimensions. Such screening is obviously costly. While the cost of screening
per application is ﬁxed, in equilibrium Government will screen an application
with some positive probability and this probability measures the intensity of
screening.8
2.3 Market-based ﬁnanciers
Entrepreneurs can also try to tap private sources for funding. Private funding
involves no application costs but entrepreneurs need to pay the market rate
for such funding. Private sector ﬁnanciers have access to unlimited supply
of ﬁnancial capital. They are competitivea n dt h er e q u i r e de x p e c t e dr a t eo f
return on investor capital is exogenous and normalized to unity.
The market-based ﬁnanciers posses no screening technology and only know
the share of high-type entrepreneurs in the population. When contemplating
whether to extend funding to an entrepreneur or not, market-based ﬁnanciers
observe whether the entrepreneur has received a subsidy from Government
8In other words, we assume imperfect commitment to screen but perfect screening
technology. Assuming perfect commitment but imperfect technology would yield identical
results. From a more practical point of view, the assumption of perfect screening technology
only means that Government can identify the prospects of projects according to its own
predetermined criteria. Such criteria of the public R&D funding policies are generally related
to expected social and private returns of the innovation projects.
12or not, and they know Government’s objective function. If the entrepreneur
applied for the subsidy, the market-based ﬁnanciers do not observe whether
Government screened the entrepreneur or not. Nor do they observe whether
an entrepreneur without a subsidy actually applied for the subsidy but in
equilibrium this is immaterial.
The assumption that Government has a superior screening ability to private
sector ﬁnanciers is of course strong, but not essential for our results. We
only need to assume that Government’s subsidy decisions are not completely
random so that the subsidy decision contains some valuable information to the
market. In other words, we could assume that private sector ﬁnanciers have
a better screening technology than Government or that receiving a subsidy
from Government oﬀers a negative signal of the entrepreneur’s type. The
assumptions we have done now are the simplest that allow Government’s
screening to provide valuable information to the market.
Moreover, there are several factors that may support our assumptions,
especially in the case of a small country like Finland. First, the public ﬁnancier
is often granting project speciﬁc funding, whereas private sector ﬁnanciers,
especially those using debt ﬁnance, typically operate at the ﬁrm level. Second,
in theory, a benevolent public ﬁnancier should not only be interested in the
ﬁnancial return generated by a project but also take into account the overall
social beneﬁts. The public ﬁnancier should therefore in theory have a larger
interest in screening than the market-based ﬁnanciers. Third, since screening
is a public good, private sector ﬁnanciers can suﬀer from a free-riding problem.
A public screening agency can oﬀer a solution to the free-riding problem.
This raises a fourth possibility why Government may have a better screening
technology: Government’s investments in screening can crowd out private
sectors’ incentives to screen. A subsidy in itself should also reduce the stake the
private sector ﬁnanciers need to take in the project, which further dilutes their
incentives to screen. So if a public screening and funding agency exists for some
reason, it may worsen the free-riding problem by giving an additional incentive
for the private sector ﬁnanciers to economize on screening investments.9 In the
Finnish case at least, the public ﬁnancier constitutes a centralized screening
device that has massive resources to screening. It receives a large amount of
applications that it can compare against each other. As a result, the public
ﬁnancier could be expected to have quite a good overview about the state of
the art in each relevant ﬁeld. At the same time, there seems to be a common
impression that the private ﬁnancial markets are underdeveloped in terms of
their screening technology.
Following Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking-order hypothesis, we assume
that to the extent an entrepreneur’s initial wealth and her public funding
is insuﬃcient, the entrepreneur issues debt to market-based ﬁnanciers. We
9The free-riding problem among investors is traditionally given as a rationale for the
existence of ﬁnancial intermediaries (eg Diamond, 1984) who monitor or screen entrepreneurs
on the behalf of small, dispersed investors. However, the literature has overlooked the
possibility that large governmental investments in screening do not leave room for a private
sector solution to emerge. We emphasize that private incentives to screen deteriorate even
if the public screening is of poor quality or there is negative correlation between public and
private funding objectives.
13consider risky debt contracts that give a ﬁnancier ﬁxed payment in the
case of success and zero in the case of failure. In principle this does not
require all entrepreneurs to have the same repayment obligation. Since the
market-based ﬁnanciers are uninformative, our focus on debt ﬁnancing is not
entirely implausible. Moreover, such risky debt contracts are optimal when
project success is veriﬁable but returns are not,10 and we restrict our attention
to a ‘realistic’ subspace of contracts where i) parties are protected by limited
liability; ii) markets must clear;11 and iii) the ﬁnancial contract cannot specify
a positive reward for an entrepreneur to refrain from investing.12
3 Innovation ﬁnance without public funding
We begin with analyzing the case without public support of innovation. This
case reduces to a fairly standard model of entrepreneurial ﬁnance under
incomplete information. In our set-up the entrepreneurs diﬀer in the amount of
initial capital they posses, and our focus is to determine how the composition
of entrepreneurs receiving market-based ﬁnancing depends on the amount of
their initial capital.
In the absence of public funding, there are three periods beyond the initial
determination of types.
[0.] Nature draws a type i ∈ {L,H} for an entrepreneur. Probabilities of a
high type and a low type are p and 1 − p, 0 <p<1.
[1.] The entrepreneur observes her type and decides whether to seek external
funding.
[2.] Financiers decide whether to give funding under the terms proposed by
the entrepreneur, and the funded projects are executed.
[3.] Project returns are realized, successful entrepreneurs compensate their
ﬁnanciers according to the contract terms.
In the last stage of the game, an entrepreneur and her ﬁnancier(s) split the







i is the share received by an entrepreneur of type i and RF
i is her
ﬁnancier’s share.
An entrepreneur is willing to launch the project if her expected proﬁt
from the project is at least as much as the entrepreneur would get from
investing the initial capital into alternative sources, ie, the market value of
10Equivalently, project returns are veriﬁable up to RH as, eg in Bolton and Sharfstein
(1990). In this case the distinction between debt and equity becomes moot. Following, eg
de Meza and Webb (2000), we could also assume that instead of veriﬁable project success,
only payments are veriﬁable and that entrepreneurs cannot hide income in case they default.
11Further we rule out the unrealistic possibility that entrepreneurs could publicly destroy
their initial wealth.
12Optimal security design with full contracting opportunities in the presence of incomplete
information and a public funding agency is an intriguing topic for future research.
14initial capital. Since the rate of return on capital is assumed to be equal to
one, the entrepreneur’s participation constraint reads as
λiR
E




i = Ri − R
E
i = Ri −
A
λi
captures the i-type entrepreneur’s pledgeable income, that is, the maximum
amount an entrepreneur of type i c a nc r e d i b l yp r o m i s et op a yb a c kt oa
ﬁnancier in the case of success.
We will ﬁrst identify the region of initial capital in which high-type
entrepreneurs have no means to credibly signal their quality. Low-type
entrepreneurs can always pretend to be high-type entrepreneurs if the low
types’ pledgeable income is higher, ie, when RF max
L ≥ RF max
H .S o l v i n g t h i s
inequality for A gives
A ≤ ˆ A ≡
λLλH (RL − RH)
λH − λL
(3.2)
When the initial wealth is less than ˆ A, the maximum repayment a high-type
entrepreneur is willing to promise to the ﬁnancier if the project succeeds is
never higher than what a low-type entrepreneur could promise. This means
that when (3.2) holds, a high-type entrepreneur has no means to truthfully
signal her quality even if she had an incentive to do so. A low-type entrepreneur
could oﬀer the ﬁnancier a larger return but it is not in her interest to reveal
her type. Hence, both types oﬀe rt h es a m er e p a y m e n tt ot h eﬁnancier.
Financiers, who are assumed to be competitive and break even, are willing
to invest in a project if the expected return from investing equals the market
value of funds supplied, I−A. They do not observe the type of the entrepreneur
they are facing, but know the proportions of high and low types (p and 1−p,
respectively) in the population. The minimum repayment F that a ﬁnancier





where ¯ λ = pλH +( 1− p)λL is the expected success probability in a pooling
equilibrium. The maximum repayment that a high-type entrepreneur, and by
implication, a low-type entrepreneur, are willing to oﬀer to the ﬁnancier is
RF
H = RH − A







Equation (3.4) is the ﬁnancier’s participation constraint when A ≤ ˆ A.T h e
left hand side of (3.4) is the minimum repayment that the ﬁnancier requires
to invest in a project and the right hand side is the maximum repayment any
entrepreneur can promise to the ﬁnancier. Solving (3.4) for A gives
A ≥ ¯ A ≡
λH
¡
I − ¯ λRH
¢
λH − ¯ λ
(3.5)
15In (3.5), ¯ A gives the threshold value of initial capital needed to get
ﬁnancing, when the ﬁnancier anticipates all the entrepreneurs to seek ﬁnancing.
Entrepreneurs with A< ¯ A cannot get market-based ﬁnancing for their project.
When A> ˆ A, RF max
H >R F max
L , a high-type entrepreneur could truthfully
signal her quality, but it is not necessarily in her interest to do so. Given
the assumption of competitive ﬁnancial markets, the minimum amount that
a ﬁnancier requires to invest in a project of unknown entrepreneurial quality
c o n t i n u e st ob et h ep o o l i n go n e ,a sl o n ga sa l s ol o w - t y p ee n t r e p r e n e u r sc a n
aﬀord oﬀering F to the ﬁnancier. This happens when RF max








The left hand side of (3.6) is the minimum repayment the ﬁnancier requires
to invest in a project in a pooling equilibrium and the right hand side is
the maximum repayment a low-type entrepreneur is willing to promise to the
ﬁnancier. Solving (3.6) for A gives us
A ≤ ˙ A ≡
λL(¯ λRL − I)
p(λH − λL)
(3.7)
A high-type entrepreneur has no incentive to separate herself from a low-type:
she should oﬀer at least RF max
L to a ﬁnancier to credibly signal her type, but
only F is needed to ensure funding.
When A> ˙ A, a low-type entrepreneur can no longer oﬀer F to a ﬁnancier
and will drop out with this interest rate. However, if the ﬁnancier knew that
the entrepreneur seeking funding is of a high-type, I−A
λH w o u l db eal a r g ee n o u g h
repayment for the ﬁnancier to be willing to invest in her project. But because
λH > ¯ λ, a low-type entrepreneur can oﬀer the ﬁnancier I−A
λH for some values of
A greater than ˙ A. Solving the inequality I−A
λH ≤ RL − A




≡ ¨ A (3.8)
Only when A> ¨ A,t h eﬁnancier knows that only high-type entrepreneurs
remain in the pool of loan applicants and are willing to accept I−A
λH .I f ˙ A ≤ A ≤
¨ A, a low-type entrepreneur can pretend to be of high-type by oﬀering I−A
λH to the
ﬁnancier. Therefore, when ˙ A ≤ A ≤ ¨ A , there is a semi-separating equilibrium
in which all the high-type entrepreneurs and a share of low-type entrepreneurs
are funded. In other words, only a share of low-type entrepreneurs applies for
funding.
Figure 1 summarizes diﬀerent funding regions for various values of initial
capital. Given that ¯ A and ˙ A depend on the share of high-type entrepreneurs
in the population (p), the diﬀerent regions are presented with coordinates (p,
A), p ∈ [0,1], A ∈ [0,I].W h e n A<m i n { ˆ A, ¯ A}, market-based ﬁnanciers
are willing to fund no projects. Note that for this region, the upper bound
of p is
I−λLRH
(λH−λL)RH.W h e n A ∈ [ ¯ A, ˙ A] all entrepreneurs are funded. When
A ∈]max
n
ˆ A, ˙ A
o
, ¨ A], all the high-type entrepreneurs and a share of low-type
16entrepreneurs are funded. When A> ¨ A, only high-type entrepreneurs are
funded.
Let us compare the outcome in each region of Figure 1 to the outcome under
complete information. With complete information, any high-type entrepreneur
will receive funding by oﬀering I−A
λH to the ﬁnancier, since the rate of return
required by the ﬁnancier is normalized to unity and the NPV of the project
is positive. In contrast, the low-type entrepreneurs’ projects have a negative
NPV, which raises the cost of external funding for low-types so high that
no low-type is willing to launch her project. Because all projects by H-type
entrepreneurs but no projects by L-types will be executed, the market for
entrepreneurial ﬁn a n c ei se ﬃcient, and there is no need for Government
intervention.
The region 4 in Figure 1 where A> ¨ A corresponds to the complete
information outcome. Only high-type entrepreneurs are ﬁnanced, and the
ﬁnancier gets I−A
λH , if the project succeeds.
In region 2 where A ∈ [ ¯ A, ˙ A] a n di nr e g i o n3w h e r eA ∈]max
n
ˆ A, ˙ A
o
, ¨ A],
all the high-type entrepreneurs are ﬁnanced so there is no social ineﬃciency
related to the ﬁnancing of high-type entrepreneurs. But also at least some
low-type entrepreneurs are ﬁnanced, which creates a social loss compared with
the complete information case where no low-type entrepreneurs are ﬁnanced.
In other words, under incomplete information there is excessive ﬁnancing in
r e g i o n s2a n d3 ,a si nd eM e z aa n dW e b b( 1 9 8 7 ) . I ne q u i l i b r i u mh i g h - t y p e
entrepreneurs also cross-subsidize low-types and receive lower share from a
successful project than what they would get under complete information.
In region 1 (A<m i n { ˆ A, ¯ A} ) no entrepreneur is ﬁnanced. In other
words, there is a funding gap. From the social point of view it is eﬃcient
that low-type entrepreneurs do not get ﬁnancing. High-type entrepreneurs
s h o u l d ,h o w e v e r ,g e tﬁnancing as in the complete information case. Financial
constraints that prevent high-type entrepreneurs with A<m i n { ˆ A, ¯ A} from
undertaking economically viable innovation projects create a social loss. Since
this paper is about ﬁnancing constraints, we in what follows focus on region 1
where the funding gap exists.
We summarize the main result of the section in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In a population where the share of high-type entrepreneurs p
fulﬁlls p ≤
I−λLRH
(λH−λL)RH, high-type entrepreneurs with A<m i n { ˆ A, ¯ A} suﬀer
from the funding gap that prevents them from undertaking economically viable
innovation projects.
4 R&D subsidy application and allocation
In this section we solve the subgame where entrepreneurs contemplate applying
for subsidies and Government decides on screening and awarding a subsidy,
abstracting from the funding decisions of the market-based ﬁnanciers. We
will focus on region 1 of Figure 1 where the funding gap prevails, and proceed
under the assumption that receiving a subsidy is both a necessary and suﬃcient
17condition to secure the additional external funding from private sources.13
In the next section we verify the parameter values when this constitutes an
equilibrium of the full game where the funding decisions of the market-based
ﬁnanciers are explicitly taken into account. In other words, in this section
we assume that with the subsidy an entrepreneur can launch an innovation
project that could not be undertaken otherwise.
Because the subgame considered in this section is more complicated than
the standard adverse selection model outlined in the previous section, let us
be somewhat more rigorous in describing the timing of actions and agents’
strategies.
[0.] Nature draws a type i∈ {H,L}. Probabilities of a high type and a low
type are p and 1 − p,0<p <1 .
[1.] The entrepreneur observes her type and then chooses whether to apply
(AP) for an R&D subsidy or not (NAP). In other words, the entrepreneur
chooses an action aE ∈ AE = {AP,NAP} where AE is the action space of the
entrepreneur.
[2.] Government receives the application, but does not observe the type of the
entrepreneur. It has to decide whether to screen (SC) the application or not
(NSC), ie, Government chooses an action aG
1 ∈ AG
1 ={SC, NSC}w h e r eAG
1 is
the Government’s action space at this stage.
[3.] Government decides whether to give the entrepreneur a ﬁxed subsidy of
S or not. At this stage, Government chooses an action aG
2 ∈ AG
2 ={ S, NS}
where AG
2 is the Government’s action space.
[4.] The entrepreneurs who received the subsidy obtain market-based funding
and can execute their projects, and payoﬀs are realized as shown below.
S i n c et h ee n t r e p r e n e u r ’ sa c t i o ni nt h el a s ts t a g eo ft h eg a m ei st r i v i a l ,t h e
entrepreneur’s only strategic decision is to whether to apply for a subsidy or
n o ti ns t a g e1 . H e n c ew ec a nw r i t et h a tt h ee n t r e p r e n e u r ’ sp u r es t r a t e g ysE
equals her action aE and her pure-strategy space is ΣE = AE = {AP,NAP}.
If Government screens and ﬁnds out the true type of the entrepreneur in
stage 2, it gives a subsidy to a high-type entrepreneur but not to a low-type
entrepreneur in stage 3. Government’s pure-strategy space is hence
Σ
G = {SC, S if i = H, NS if i = L),(NSC, S),(NSC, NS)}
In the following we refer to the ﬁrst strategy as SC so
Σ
G = {SC,(NSC, S),(NSC, NS)}
As we focus on Perfect Bayesian equilibria, Government’s updated belief
θ about the entrepreneur’s type in the non-singleton information sets is
determined by Bayes’ Rule using the prior probabilities and the equilibrium
strategies. Figure 2 shows the extensive-form representation of the subgame.
Let Π
G,i
sG refer to Government’s payoﬀ from choosing a pure-strategy
sG ∈ ΣG when the entrepreneur applies for a subsidy and the type of the
13This assumption is qualitatively in line with reality, since in practice R&D subsidies are
paid against incurred costs. If a project does not get market-based ﬁnancing, the project
cannot be launched and the subsidy will not be paid.
18entrepreneur is i ∈ {H,L}. When Government decides to screen (sG = SC)




SC = λH(RH + W) − I − gS − c − σ (4.1)
Upon ﬁnding out that the entrepreneur is of a high-type, Government grants
a subsidy S to the entrepreneur who can then secure the rest of the required
funds, I + c − A − S, from the private sector ﬁnanciers and is able to launch
her project. Recall that the total size of the project is I+c after the monetary
cost of applying for the subsidy (c) is taken into account. The entrepreneur’s
and her private sector ﬁnanciers’ joint expected payoﬀ is then λHRH −I −c+
S. Since Government’s objective function includes the private sector agents’
payoﬀs as an argument, the net cost of the subsidy to Government consists of
the shadow cost of public funds gS and the screening cost σ. Equation (4.1)
also shows how a successful project of a high-type entrepreneur generates a
social beneﬁt W to Government beyond the returns captured by private sector
agents.
Similarly, if Government decides to avoid screening costs, but nonetheless




NSC,S = λH(RH + W) − I − gS − c (4.2)
which is identical to (4.1) save the cost of screening σ. Government’s payoﬀ




NSC,S = λLRL − I − gS − c (4.3)
In this case, there are no societal beneﬁts associated to the low-type
entrepreneur’s project even if it succeeds.




SC = −c − σ (4.4)
After screening and realizing that the entrepreneur is of a low type, the
Government does not give a subsidy. Hence, under our assumptions,
the entrepreneur cannot execute her project. For the same reason, the
Government’s payoﬀ in case Government does not screen and does not give
a subsidy is simply
Π
G,i
NSC,NS = −c (4.5)
irrespective of the entrepreneur’s type.
Let us next consider the entrepreneurs’ payoﬀs from applying for a
subsidy to any given Government’s pure strategy sG ∈ ΣG.A h i g h - t y p e
entrepreneur gets a subsidy if Government follows either the strategy sG =SC
19or sG =(NSC,S), and if Government follows the strategy sG =(NSC, NS),s h e
does not get a subsidy. Similarly, if Government follows either the strategy
sG =SC or sG =(NSC,NS), a low-type entrepreneur does not get a subsidy,
but if sG =(NSC,S), she gets a subsidy. Since from the entrepreneur’s point
of view the only payoﬀ-relevant decision of the Government is whether it gives
a subsidy or not, we will use Π
E,i
aG
2 to denote the payoﬀ of an entrepreneur of
type i∈ {H,L} to the Government’s second action aG
2 ∈ AG
2 . As a result, the


















, her payoﬀ is
Π
E,i
NS = −c (4.7)
In (4.6), FS is the entrepreneur’s repayment obligation to the market-based
ﬁnancier if the entrepreneur has received a subsidy and her project succeeds.
For the moment we take it given but it will be determined as part of equilibrium
in section 5.
4.1 Equilibria
Since a pure-strategy equilibrium is an equilibrium in degenerate mixed
strategies, we focus on mixed strategies. We focus on PBE where a high-type
entrepreneur always applies, and a low-type entrepreneur chooses a mixed
strategy μs
E ∈ ∆ΣE where ∆ΣE denotes the set of probability distributions
over pure strategies and μsE is the probability assigned to a pure strategy
sE ∈ ΣE = {AP,NAP}.14 Similarly, Government chooses a mixed strategy
αsG ∈ ∆ΣG over pure strategies sG ∈ ΣG = {SC,(NSC,S),(NSC,NS)}.
As μs
Eand αsG are probability distributions we will write that μAP = μ,
μNAP =1−μ,a n dαNSC,NS =1−αSC−αNSC,S (μ,αSC,α NSC,S ≥ 0). In other
words, a low-type entrepreneur applies with probability μ and Government
randomizes between strategies SC,( NSC, S)a n d( NSC, NS) with probabilities
αSC, αNSC,S and 1 − αSC − αNSC,S.
We ﬁrst consider optimal strategies for a low-type entrepreneur. Low-type
entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ from applying given that Government follows
am i x e ds t r a t e g yαsG is
E(Π
E,L,





and from not applying zero.
14It can be shown that with the exception of the trivial equilibrium where no-one applies
and Government does not grant subsidies, high-types always apply in the parameter region
we focus on. That is, the region in which high-type entrepreneurs suﬀer from the funding
gap, and screening is a plausible strategy for Government. Brieﬂy, the reason why H-types
always apply in the equilibrium we focus on is that the market-based ﬁnanciers interpret
all entrepreneurs without subsidies as L-types and do not give them the additional funding
required to implement the project.
20If E(Π
E,L
AP ) > 0, a low-type entrepreneur always applies and if E(Π
E,L
AP ) < 0,
she never applies. If E(Π
E,L
AP )=0 , low-type entrepreneur is indiﬀerent, and
uses a mixed strategy μ,(1 − μ). Substituting (4.6) for Π
E,L
S and −c (from
(4.7)) for Π
E,L
NS in (4.8) and solving the inequalities shows that
• if αNSC,S > c
λL(RL−FS)−A+c, the best strategy for a low-type entrepreneur
is to apply (μ=1 );
• if αNSC,S < c
λL(RL−FS)−A+c, the best strategy for a low-type entrepreneur
is not to apply (μ =0 ); and
• if αNSC,S = c
λL(RL−FS)−A+c, a low-type entrepreneur randomizes between
applying and not with probabilities μ and (1 − μ).
Given Government’s mixed strategy αsG, the expected payoﬀ of a high-type
entrepreneur from applying is
E(Π
E,H
AP )=( αSC + αNSC,S)Π
E,H







NS are speciﬁed by (4.6) and (4.7). If a high-type
entrepreneur does not apply for a subsidy her net payoﬀ is zero. Consequently,




AP ) > 0 (4.10)
must hold.
Let us turn to the Government’s optimal strategies. Since a low-type
entrepreneur is using a mixed strategy (μ,1 − μ), Government’s belief θ that
an applicant is of a high-type is given by Bayes’ Rule as
θ =
p
p + μ(1 − p)
(4.11)
Government’s expected payoﬀ from choosing pure strategy screening
(αSC =1 )is E(ΠG
SC)=θΠ
G,H
SC +( 1− θ)Π
G,L
SC which, by using (4.1) and (4.4),
can be written as
E(Π
G
SC)=θ[λH (RH + W) − I − gS] − c − σ (4.12)




NSC,S)=θ[λH (RH + W)] + (1 − θ)λLRL − I − gS − c (4.13)
Finally, from choosing pure-strategy sG =(NSC, NS) (αSC = αNSC,S =0 ),








, it is optimal for Government to







then sG =( NSC,S)( αNSC,S =1 ) is optimal for Government and if both
E(ΠG
SC) and E(ΠG
NSC,S) are smaller than -c, pure strategy sG =( NSC,NS)
(αSC = αNSC,S =0 )is optimal. Whenever the payoﬀsf r o mp u r es t r a t e g i e sa r e
equal, Government is indiﬀerent between the corresponding pure strategies.
It turns out that Government’s best response to a low-type’s mixed strategy
























. The order of
Land ¯ L and the magnitude of L, ¯ L and ˆ L — and thus the set of sensible
Government strategies — depends on the values of σ and p.W h e n L < ¯ L it
holds that
• if μ<L , the best strategy for Government is (NSC, S)( αNSC,S =1 );
• if L <μ< ¯ L, the best strategy for Government is SC (αSC =1 );
• if μ>¯ L, the best strategy for Government is (NSC, NS) (1 − αSC −
αNSC,S =1 ) ;
• if μ = L, Government is indiﬀerent between SC and (NSC, S); and
• if μ = ¯ L, Government is indiﬀerent between SC and (NSC, NS).
When L > ¯ L it holds that
• if μ<ˆ L, the best strategy for Government is (NSC, S) (αNSC,S =1 ) ;
• if μ>ˆ L, the best strategy for Government is (NSC, NS) (1 − αSC −
αNSC,S =1 ) ;a n d
• if μ = ˆ L, Government is indiﬀerent between (NSC, NS)a n d( NSC, S).
Figure 3 presents sensible strategies for diﬀerent sets of values of parameters
σ and p. Note that based on Proposition 1, we know that in the presence
of ﬁnancing constraints p ≤
I−λLRH
(λH−λL)RH.T h e ﬁgure identiﬁes four diﬀerent
regions. In regions 1 and 2, screening is a plausible strategy, whereas in regions
3 and 4 the combinations of p and σ are such that screening is never optimal.
In region 3 it is always optimal for Government to grant a subsidy without
screening. In other words, the screening costs are so high compared to the
relatively high share of high-type entrepreneurs in the population that it is
optimal for Government just to grant a subsidy to every applicant. In region
4 Government chooses between strategies (NSC,S)and (NSC, NS).




λH(RH+W)−λLRL ,(1 − p)(I + gS − λLRL)
o
.
22Propositions 1 and 2 identify the parameter regions which are the focus of this
paper. Since our aim is to analyze the screening activities of Government, we
consider regions 1 and 2 from Figure 3 and restrict σ to fulﬁll the condition
presented in Proposition 2. This restriction implies that L < ¯ L. In addition
this parameter restriction rules out the unrealistic case that if all entrepreneurs
apply it is never optimal for Government to just grant subsidies to all.15
Within the region of interest, the plausible strategies for Government
depend on whether ¯ L i sg r e a t e ro rs m a l l e rt h a no n e . I f¯ L is greater than
one, then the strategy (NSC, NS) is not a plausible option for Government.
In practice ¯ L is smaller than 1 only if σ>p (λH (RH + W) − I − gS).T h e
intuition is that (NSC, NS) is a plausible strategy for Government only if
screening costs are high relative to the share of high-type entrepreneurs in the
population.
Figure 4 below summarizes the optimal strategies for Government. Note
that if ¯ L is larger than 1, the area in which screening is the optimal strategy
extends to one and (NSC, NS)i sn ol o n g e rap l a u s i b l es t r a t e g yf o rG o v e r n m e n t .
We can now state the main result of this section.
Proposition 3 In a PBE of the game




• A high-type entrepreneur always applies.








• Government randomizes between SC and (NSC, S) with probabilities
αSC =
λL(RL−FS)
λL(RL−FS)−A+c and αNSC,S = c
λL(RL−FS)−A+c.
PROOF. Let ﬁrst prove that there is no pure strategy equilibrium in this
game. If a low-type entrepreneur always applies, αNSC,S > c
λL(RL−FS)−A+c
must hold. However, if μ = 1, it is optimal for Government to choose (NSC,
NS), implying that αNSC,S =0 . If a low-type entrepreneur never applies then
αNSC,S < c
λL(RL−FS)−A+c .B u t i f μ =0, it is optimal for Government to set
αNSC,S =1 , which is larger than c
λL(RL−FS)−A+c.
For a low-type to be willing to use a mixed strategy μ>0, αNSC,S
must be equal to c
λL(RL−FS)−A+c. Given that αNSC,S > 0, the only possible
mixed strategy for Government is to randomize between SC and (NSC,S)
with probabilities αNSC,S = c
λL(RL−FS)−A+c and αSC =
λL(RL−FS)
λL(RL−FS)−A+c.T h i s
Government strategy satisﬁes αSC + αNSC,S > c
λH(RH−FS)−A+c,a sr e q u i r e db y
the assumption that high-type entrepreneurs always apply. When Government
15Substituting p for θ in equations (4.11) and (4.12) gives that (SC)i sb e t t e rt h a n( NSC,S)
if σ<(1 − p)(I + gS − λLRL) and (NSC, NS) is better than (NSC, S)i fp<
I+gS−λLRL
λHW−λLRL.
23randomizes between SC and (NSC,S), a low-type entrepreneur applies with









The above equilibrium is based on the assumption that the subsidy program is
in place and Government chooses whether to screen or not. In other words, the
possibility to just close the program is not taken into account. If Government
chooses to close the whole program, the payoﬀ is zero to both entrepreneur and
Government (ignoring the costs related to the closing of the program). If the
strategy proﬁle identiﬁed by Proposition 3 generates a strictly positive payoﬀ to
Government then it is an equilibrium, even taking into account the possibility
of closing the subsidy program. It can be shown that the above strategy proﬁle
remains an equilibrium with minor modiﬁcations to the restriction imposed on
σ in Proposition 2.16
Government’s mixed strategy can be interpreted as Government deciding
on the intensity of screening. The higher is the probability of screening versus
automatically granting a subsidy, the higher is the screening intensity and the
higher is the probability of ﬁnding out the true type of the project. Only
if the probability of screening is equal to one, screening is truly perfect and
Government ﬁnds out the true type of the project for sure.17
Comparative statistics of the Government screening probability would be
straightforward if we took the entrepreneur’s repayment obligation, FS ,a s
ﬁxed. However, in an equilibrium of the full game, determined in the next
section, the parameters of FS will include S, c, αSC and θ.A s a r e s u l t , i n
an equilibrium of the full game, the formula for αSC given in Proposition
3 is in an implicit form. Appendix presents the partial derivatives of the
screening probability with respect to σ, c, A and S when FSis endogenous.
If the parameters are such that Government is relatively conﬁdent that an
application comes from a high-type entrepreneur (p or the equilibrium value
of θ is suﬃciently high), the results are intuitive: the screening probability
is decreasing in the screening cost, in the application cost, and in the initial
wealth, and increasing in the level of the subsidy.
Fortunately, comparative statics of the low-type’s optimal strategy are easy:
an increase in the screening cost increases low-type’s application probability,
as could be expected, but an increase in the subsidy decreases the application
probability. The latter outcome may seem counterintuitive, but it is explained
by the screening probability that increases with S.I fS increases, low-type
entrepreneurs anticipate an increase in the screening probability and are less
likely to apply. Hence, public screening works more eﬃciently in discouraging
low-type entrepreneurship if it accompanied with subsidy allocation.
16Instead of σ ≤
(I+gS−λLRL)(λH(RH+W)−I−gS)
λH(RH+W)−λLRL we need to have σ ≤
(I+gS−λLRL)(λH(RH+W)−I−gS−c)
λH(RH+W)−λLRL .
17Clearly, it would be equivalent to assume that Government can commit to screen all
applications but makes mistakes in screening.
245 Public and private funding of innovations
We are ready to analyze the full model where the entrepreneurs can ﬁrst apply
for an R&D subsidy from Government, and then seek market-based ﬁnancing
from other sources. For brevity, we assume that in the funding gap region that
we are focusing on, entrepreneurs have enough initial wealth to apply for a
subsidy (A>c ) and need external market-based ﬁnancing in addition to the
subsidy to be able to undertake the innovation project (A− c + S < I).
As mentioned, we assume that the private ﬁnancier observes whether
the entrepreneur has received an R&D subsidy or not, and it knows
how Government funding policy works. The subsidy observation provides
additional information to the market-based ﬁnancier about the type of the
project. The market-based ﬁnanciers’ beliefs in the non-singleton information
sets, ˆ λ, is determined by Bayes’ Rule using the prior probabilities and the
equilibrium strategies. Then, if the entrepreneur has been granted a subsidy,
market-based ﬁnanciers’ participation constraint reads as
I − A − S + c ≤ ˆ λF
S (5.1)
where ˆ λ is the updated success probability when the entrepreneur has received
an R&D subsidy, and it is determined by Bayes’ Rule as
ˆ λ = P(H|S)λH +[ 1− P(H|S)]λL (5.2)
In (5.2), P(H|S) is the conditional probability that the entrepreneur is of a
high-type, given that she has received an R&D subsidy from Government.
In equilibrium, Government randomizes between SC and (NSC, S)w i t h
probabilities αSC and 1−αSC. This means that P(H|S)=ˆ p = αSC+(1−αSC)θ
where θ and αSC are given by Proposition 3. Since in this equilibrium H-types
always apply, the ﬁnancier knows for sure that an entrepreneur without a
subsidy is a low-type entrepreneur. Given that ﬁnanciers must break-even,
equation (5.1) holds with equality and the share of a successful project given
to a ﬁnancier is
F
S =
I − A − S + c
ˆ λ
(5.3)
The entrepreneur’s participation constraint remains λiRE
i ≥ A,s i n c et o
receive an R&D subsidy the entrepreneur has to invest her initial wealth
in the project (where now the application and investment constitute the
project). The pledgeable income that can be oﬀered to the ﬁnancier is
RF max
i = Ri − RE
i = Ri − A
λi as before. As a result, an entrepreneur with
a subsidy can get market-based ﬁnancing if






The right hand side of the equation (5.4) is the pledgeable income that a
high-type entrepreneur is willing to oﬀer to the ﬁnancier, and it is the same
25as without a subsidy program. Solving equation (5.4) for A shows that if the
entrepreneur has been granted an R&D subsidy, the private ﬁnanciers grant
funding if
A ≥ ¯ A
S ≡
λH
λH − ˆ λ
[I − S + c − ˆ λRH]
Proposition 4 Entrepreneurs with an R&D subsidy can get market-based
ﬁnancing with less initial capital, ie ¯ A> ¯ AS,i f ˆ λ ≥ ¯ λ.










(I − S + c − ˆ λRH) ⇔
(ˆ λ−¯ λ)(λHRH −I)+(λH +¯ λ)(S −c) > 0. From the last inequality we can see
that it holds if ˆ λ ≥ ¯ λ. High-type projects are economically viable, therefore
λHRH − I>0. Since we are analyzing entrepreneurs that have been granted
an R&D subsidy, (λH + ¯ λ)(S −c) > 0,i fS > c and ¯ A> ¯ AS even if ˆ λ = ¯ λ. ¤
Proposition 5 Due to Government screening, the fact that an entrepreneur
has received an R&D subsidy provides an informative signal to the ﬁnancier,
ie ˆ λ>¯ λ.
PROOF. ˆ λ =ˆ pλH+(1−ˆ p)λL > ¯ λ,i fˆ p>p . Knowing that ˆ p = αSC+(1−αSC)θ
gives us that for ˆ p>p , αSC must satisfy αSC >
p−θ
1−θ. T h i si st r u es i n c e
p<θ=
p
p+μ(1−p) < 1 (0 < p <1a n d0<μ <1 ) .¤
Figure 5 shows how the funding gap region presented in Figure 1 changes
as a result of the introduction of a subsidy program. From equation (3.2) we
know that ˆ A ≡
λLλH(RL−RH)
λH−λL and it does not change when a subsidy program is
introduced, since the participation constraint of an entrepreneur remains the
same. What happens is that the ¯ A-curve shifts downward. Whether the shift
reduces ﬁnancial constraints depends on the value of ˆ p.








,w h e r eαSC and μ are the equilibrium
strategies and ˆ p =
I−S+c−λLRL
λHRH−λLRL .
PROOF: ¯ A> ¯ AS must hold for a speciﬁcv a l u eo fˆ p, if the subsidy
program reduces ﬁnancial constraints. It can be shown that ¯ A> ¯ AS ⇔
ˆ p ≥
I−S+c−λLRL
λHRH−λLRL =ˆ p. Proposition 1 gives that in the funding gap region
p<
I−λLRH
(λH−λL)RH =¯ p.I t c a n b e s h o w n t h a t¯ p>ˆ p. In addition we know from
Proposition 5 that for a given p, ˆ p>p , so the lower bound of p is smaller
than ˆ p. Substituting for
p
p+μ(1−p) for θ in ˆ p = αSC +( 1− αSC)θ gives the
implicit form for p as a function of ˆ p,αSC and μ that is p =
(ˆ p−αSC)μ
(1−ˆ p)+(ˆ p−αSC)μ.
26Substituting ˆ p for ˆ p gives the lower bound of p in the implicit form and the
interval in Proposition 6. ¤
Propositions 4, 5 and 6 summarize the main result. R&D subsidies and the
related screening process can help ﬁnancially constrained entrepreneurs to
get external ﬁnancing for their innovation projects, if the share of high-type
entrepreneurs in the population is suﬃciently high. Two diﬀerent channels
generate this eﬀect. The ﬁrst one presented in Proposition 4 is a trivial
one: a subsidy reduces the amount of external capital needed, thus reducing
capital costs. The more interesting channel is the second one presented
in Proposition 5: subsidy observation provides additional information to
market-based ﬁnanciers about the quality of the project. With this additional
information, market-based ﬁnanciers are willing to fund entrepreneurs with a
subsidy with a lower rate of return and this reduces the funding gap.
The expected total welfare eﬀect of R&D subsidies to a society, with p
belonging to the interval stated in Proposition 6, depends on the distribution of
initial wealth. What happens is that the initial wealth required to get ﬁnancing
from private sources becomes smaller, ie ¯ A is transformed to ¯ AS.F i g u r e 6
presents the the pledgeable incomes of a low and high type entrepreneurs,
RF max
L and RF max
H , and the share of a successful project that a ﬁnancier requires
to invest in the project with and without a subsidy, FS and F. When a subsidy
program is introduced the repayment required by a ﬁnancier declines from F
to FS and, as a result, the funding gap region reduces from [0, ¯ A] to [0, ¯ AS].








In equilibrium Government is indiﬀerent between the strategies SC and NSC,S,








(I + gS − λLRL)[λH (RH + W) − I − gS − c)] − σ[λH (RH + W) − λLRL]
I + gS − λLRL
Depending on the value of σ this can be either positive or negative. If
σ<
(I + gS − λLRL)[λH (RH + W) − I − gS − c)]
λH (RH + W) − λLRL)
then E(ΠG) is positive.18
The expected total net beneﬁt to the society depends on the share of
entrepreneurs whose initial wealth is in the interval [ ¯ AS, ¯ A].A s t h e m a s s






18Note that this restriction on σ i st h es a m ea st h eo n ed e r i v e db yt a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h e
possibility that Government can close down the program, see footnote 16.
27Clearly the outcome is not the ﬁrst-best: also some low-type entrepreneurs
are ﬁnanced. However, if the total net beneﬁt to the society is positive, the
subsidy program improves the market outcome under asymmetric information.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This study examined the role of R&D subsidies in reducing ﬁnancial constraints
created by adverse selection. Financial constraints are one of the rationales
used to justify government intervention in the form of R&D subsidies. The
ﬁndings of this study provide insights into under which conditions and
through which channels R&D subsidies could be expected to alleviate ﬁnancial
constraints. The following conclusions can be drawn:
• Asymmetric information about the quality of R&D projects creates
ﬁnancing constraints for collateral-poor ﬁrms, if there is non-negligible
share of non-viable projects within the economy.
• R&D subsidy policies that involve screening of the projects are
sustainable, if the screening costs are low enough.
• The higher the expected loss generated by low-quality projects and
the lower the share of high-quality projects within the economy, the
higher the screening costs can be without rendering screening activities
unsustainable.
• Under the above circumstances R&D subsidies can reduce ﬁnancing
constraints. This eﬀect is generated through two diﬀerent channels: 1)
The subsidy in itself reduces the cost of external capital because the need
for market-based ﬁnancing diminishes. 2) If market-based ﬁnanciers can
observe that a project has received a subsidy from the public agency,
the subsidy provides an informative signal about the quality of the R&D
project. A subsidy-observation increases the success probability of the
project anticipated by the market-based ﬁnancier. This reduces the cost
of external capital for subsidized projects.
These ﬁndings highlight that the screening activities related to R&D subsidy
policies can have a role of their own in reducing ﬁnancial constraints. Instead
of merely allocating subsidies, the public agency could have a certiﬁcation role
and yet reduce the ﬁnancing constraints. This raises the question of whether,
in terms of ﬁnancial constraints, it would suﬃce to reduce the asymmetry
of information merely through screening. We ﬁnd, however, that granting
funding besides screening not only strengthens the leverage eﬀect but also
m a k e ss c r e e n i n gm o r ee ﬃcient in discouraging low-quality entrepreneurship.
Even if we consider public screening to be a solution to the ﬁnancial
constraints, an additional question is: do we need a public screening agency or
are there ways to increase the screening activities of market based ﬁnanciers?
It can be argued that public screening activities only crow out private ones and
hinder the development of eﬃcient screening technologies in ﬁnancial market..
28While this paper is more a positive analysis of application and allocation
of R&D subsidies rather than normative welfare analysis of R&D subsidies,
the ﬁndings suggest that under certain conditions R&D subsidy policies
may be welfare improving. However, we focus on the range of parameter
values where all entrepreneurs suﬀer from ﬁnancing constraints. If high-type
entrepreneurs not suﬀering from ﬁnancing constraints get subsidies, this limits
the welfare-improving prospects of subsidy policies. Nonetheless, the screening
activities of the public ﬁnancier may prevent some low-type entrepreneurs from
getting such market-based ﬁnancing they would obtain in the absence of public
funding. But even in the funding gap region the outcome is not fully eﬃcient
- also some low-quality projects are funded, and future work should consider
optimal policy.
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32Appendix
In this appendix we brieﬂy sketch the comparative statics of Government
screening probability αSC i nt h ef u l lg a m ew h e r et h ee n t r e p r e n e u r ’ sr e p a y m e n t
obligation FSis endogenous. After tedious algebra, it turns out that the partial
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A < 0 and
∂αSC
S > 0.
Note ﬁrst that in equilibrium θ is given by the exogenous parameters. It
c a nt h e nb es h o w nt h a tw h e nθ =1the denominator is positive. Moreover it
can be shown that the denominator reaches it’s minimum, which is negative,
at a negative value of θ. As a function of θ, the denominator is an upward
opening parabola, so by continuity there must be an interval of θ ∈ [ˆ θ,1],
where the denominator is positive. The restrictions imposed on σ and p imply





. Consequently, if θ
(or p)i ss u ﬃciently close to unity, there are ﬁnancially constrained high-type




Figure 1.  Market-based financing with different values of 





































































































































Region 4: Only high-type projects are financed
Region 3: All high-type projects 
and a share of low-type 
projects are financed.
Region 2: All projects are financed.
































































































































Region 4: Only high-type projects are financed
Region 3: All high-type projects 
and a share of low-type 
projects are financed.
Region 2: All projects are financed.
Region 1: None of the projects is financed. 
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Figure 2.  Extensive-form representation of the application 
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Figure 3.  Plausible government strategies with different 
      values of screening costs (σ) and different share of 
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Figure 4.  Optimal strategies for government with different 
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Figure 5.  Change in region 1, when a subsidy program is 
































Region 1: None of the projects is financed.
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Region 1: None of the projects is financed.
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Figure 6.  Change in funding gap region as a subsidy 
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